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FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS
M. Ray Doubles*
Introduction
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CON"FESSED SLAYER OF Two

CONFESSION

DETAILED.

WHY ISN'T SAM SHEPPARD IN JAIL. QUIT STALLINGBRING HIm IN.

Blazing headlines such as these, followed by detailed
accounts of the crime given to newspaper reporters by
the police, and opinions of the accused's guilt expressed
by prosecuting attorneys, or alleged confessions of the
accused with an account of his previous criminal record,
have been the basis of many recent appellate court reversals of convictions had in trial court criminal cases.
The reason assigned: Denial of a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The publication of such material prior to the trial of
the accused is defended by the news media on the ground
of its guarantee of freedom of the press; that basic in
this guarantee is the concept that "the public is entitled
to know. II
On the other hand, such publication is condemned by
the legal profession on the ground that it destroys the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial, i.e. the case of
the accused is tried in the newspaper before the very
segment of the public which must try it later in court,
viz. the jury.
Probably in no other area do two constitutional guarantees meet in such a diametrically opposed head-on
*Judge, Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, Retired. B.S.,
Davidson College, 1922; LL.B., University of Richmond, 1926; J.D., University of Chicago, 1930.
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'clash as do those of the First Amendment with those of
the Sixth and Fourteenth. Numerous proposals have been
advanced regarding a solution of the problem, extending
all the way from that of placing no restrictions on such
pre-trial publicity to that of enactment of a statute prohibiting any such publication until such information
comes out at the trial.
For a period of over a hundred years a dialogue between the professions of journalism and law has continued regarding various cleavages between the concepts
of a free press and those of due process of law in the
trial of criminal cases. As early as 1846, an article appeared concerning the effect of opinions formed by jurors
from the reading of newspapers.1 Other early articles
appeared, notably two, one in 1887 and another in 1892.2
Joint efforts 'by the American Bar Association (sometimes later referred to herein as the ABA) and the
American Newspaper Publishers Association (sometimes
later referred to herein as the ANPA) in 1925 and 1937
to resolve the problem came to nought.'
Hundreds of articles, pro and con, have appeared
through the years in reputable journals and periodicals.'
In recent years the problem has become more acute as
a result of the increase in reversal of convictions in
criminal cases due to 'alleged prejudice created at the
trial by the activities of newspaper reporting.
The Warren Report
The matter reached a climax with the slaying of Lee
1. Trial by Jury in New York, 9 L. Rep. 193 (1846).
2. Foster, Trial by Newspaper, 144 NORTH Am. Rv. 524 (1887); Forrest,
Trial by Newspapers, 14 Camr. LAW MAG. 550 (1892).
3.62 A.B.A. Rep. 851 (1937).
4. A comprehensive list of these appears commencing on page 44 of the
Report of the Special Committee on Free Press and Fair Trail of the
American Newspaper Publishers Asso. (1967).
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Harvey Oswald following the assassination of President
Kennedy in 1963, followed by the Report of the Warren
Commission thereon in 1964, which said in part:
A fundamental objection to the news policy pursued by the Dallas police, however, is the extent
to which it endangered Oswald's constitutional
right to a trial by an impartial jury. . . . The
disclosure of evidence encouraged the public,
from which a jury would ultimately be impanelled, to prejudge the very questions that
would be raised at trial. . . . Part of the responsibility. . . must be borne by the news media;
. . The general disorder . . . reveals a regrettable lack of self-discipline by the newsmen;...
The experience in Dallas during November 22-24
is a dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to
bring about a proper balance between the right
of the public to be kept informed and the right of
the individual to a fair and impartial trial.
*

As a result of this ultimatum, many agencies began to
intensify or restudy the entire matter which has come to
be known by the title: Fair Trial-Free Press or Free
Press-Fair Trial, depending upon the leaning of the
agency doing the study. Foremost among the agencies
have been two committees of the American Bar Association and of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, respectively, which on occasion have met jointly.
The Sheppard Case
Meanwhile, during this study period, the Supreme
Court of the United States, on June 6, 1966, handed down
its decision in the Sheppard Case,5 in which the Court
excoriated the trial judge, the prosecuting officials, the
5. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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police and the news media, and, in referring to some of
the pre-trial publicity, used such phrases as these: "the
'editorial artillery' opened fire;" "the newspapers emphasized evidence that tended to incriminate Sheppard;"
"For months the virulent publicity about Sheppard and
the murder had made the case notorious;" "circulation
conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the
American public in the bizarre;" "From the cases
coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent."
Report of Special Committee of
American Bar Association
Failing to reach a satisfactory accord with the news
media, and spurred to certain conclusions by what the
Court said in Sheppard, the special committee of the
ABA released its Report and Recommendations on October 1, 1966. It abounds in platitudes and compliments
to the press for the essential watchdog and public information roles it plays; and for its substantial contributions to the administration of justice through the exposure of corruptionand otherwise; and for the adoption
by some newspapers of voluntary codes to safeguard
fair trials; and it deplored any attempt to restrict the
reporting of crime news by statute or any expanded use
of the contempt process against the news media.
But then comes the dagger in cloak recommendation.
It is based upon the premise "that the primary burden
for insuring fair trial rests upon" the legal profession
and law enforcement agencies, but the news media have a
parallel responsibility for voluntary restraint in reporting criminal cases. "In the absence of such restraint, no
steps that can be taken (by the legal branch) will effectively ensure the preservation of the right of fair
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trial. " 6 Therefore, the Report recommends that the Canon
of Legal Ethics be tightened to prohibit lawyers and
prosecuting attorneys from divulging certain potentially
prejudicial information and that police departments spell
out similar restrictions in their internal regulations.
In other words, the recommendation is to cut off the
information at the source. The Report denies that this is
"to muzzle the source of information," and goes on to
explain that the question "is not whether certain disclosures can be made, but when."'
Report of the Special Committee of the
American Newspaper Pu.blishersAssociation
The special committee of the ANPA continued on with
its study and on January 5, 1967, released its excellently
documented 143 printed page Report. It likewise abounds
in many platitudes of a broad Alphonso-Gaston nature,
such as: "The American press remains as devoted to the
principles of fair trial as it is to a free press; " "Newspapers, of course, should not abuse their right to publish
without prior restraint;"' "The press shares with the
Bench, Bar and Law Enforcement officials the responsibility for preservation of the American liberties embodied
in the First and Sixth Amendments ;,,1. and many other
statements of a similar general nature.
But, when the Report gets down to specifics, while it
recommends "that the press stand at any time ready to
discuss these problems with any appropriate individuals
or groups," yet it "cannot recommend any covenants of
control or restrictions on the accurate reporting of
criminal matters, or -anything that would impair such
6. A.B.A.,

FAIR TRIAL AND FREE

PRESS 2 (Tent. Draft, 1966).

7. Id. at 78.
8. ANPA, FREE PRESS

9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 10.

AND FAIR TRIAL 2

(1967).
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reporting."' "In the reporting of crime news, the press
cannot submit to any restrictions which would deprive
the accused, as well as the public, of the right to full and
unfettered dissemination of the truth."1 2 "Aside from
the First Amendment protection afforded newspapers to
allow them to publish, there is a strong moral duty on
newspapers which requires them to print all newsworthy
information which comes to their attention and is in good
taste." 3
Thus, while the main thrust of the Report is opposition
to the promulgation of a code of restraint, the background
philosophy is crystal clear, viz, the news media has and
reserves the right to print any and all factual material,
and if problems of fair trial are created thereby, this is
a problem of the legal profession to .solve the best way
it can by such procedures as delay in trial date, change
of venue or venire, use of blue ribbon juries, etc.
The Report emphasizes, that of its ten more important
conclusions, the following one is central to all others:
The people's right to a free press which inherently embodies the right of the people to know is one
of our most fundamental rights, and neither the
press nor the Bar has the right to sit down and
bargain it away.'
The NarrowIssue
There are several areas in which the reporting of legal
matters may create an issue between the law on the one
hand, and the press on the other. One of these areas is
the manner of reporting the trial itself; another is the
conduct of news reporters in the courtroom during the
11.
12.
13.
14.

Ibid.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 1.
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progress of a trial; another is editorial comment upon
the conduct or decisions of the judge. Significant though
the problems associated with these and similar issues
are, none of these is the area in which the current problem lies; consequently, most of the broad sweeping
generalizations which one hears in the arguments pro
and con are wholly beside the point.
The narrow area in which the -basic problem lies is the
pre-trial publicity given to certain features of a particular case, and the impact that such publicity has upon the
legal process to follow.
Among the numerous facets contained in the concept
of a fair trial, one of the most important is that the accused is entitled to a trial by an unbiased, unprejudiced
and impartial jury. It may be noted also that the state
is likewise entitled to the same, but that is not the thesis
of the present article.
An unprejudiced juror is one who can honestly try the
case upon the legal evidence submitted before him in the
courtroom at a trial presided over by the judge, and upon
the law as contained in the instructions given to him by
the court. As Mr. Justice Holmes said over a half-century
ago:
The theory of our system is that the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by
any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print.1 5
If prior to the trial a juror's mind has been saturated
with a barrage of prejudicial news accompanied by glaring headlines and inflammatory editorials, and yet the information does not come out at the trial proper, it is
apparent that he cannot give the accused a fair trial no
15. Pattersonv. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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matter how honestly he might try. Even judges, who by
training and experience are experts in sifting the wheat
from the chaff, often disqualify themselves from trying a
particular case because they possess information which
they feel might unconsciously affect their judgment.
To hear some of the arguments advanced, one might
think that an attempt is being made to muzzle the press
entirely from reporting any pre-trial information. This,
of course, is not the case. Actually the issue is quite narrow. The chief complaint of the legal profession is that
news articles often carry accounts of alleged confessions
made by the accused, or statements by police officials
which contain facts and opinions indicating the guilt of
the accused, or similar statements made by the prosecuting -attorney, or the previous criminal record of the
accused. News articles of this sort, and the editorializing
thereof, are sufficient to convince the average reader and
prospective juror of the guilt of the accused prior to
trial. But as a matter of fact, the confession may never be
introduced into evidence because the court may rule that
it was improperly procured. Similarly, the prior criminal
record of the accused is admissible into evidence only in
a few exceptional instances. Many factual -successes of
police investigation do not constitute legal evidence and
as a consequence never get before the jury; yet, if broadcast by the news media in advance of the trial, the damage
is done.
The news media complain that "What these critics (of
pre-trial publicity) must realize is that a major difficulty
for the newspaper editor lies in attempting to foresee
what the Judge will consider admissible."' 6 The legal
profession is not asking that the news media be a Houdini; it only asks that certain definite narrow topics be
not published prior to trial.
16. ANPA,

FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRL&L

60 (1967).
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It is not that the legal profession wants to withhold the
information from the press, but it wants the press to withhold such information temporarily from the public, i.e.
until such time as it comes out at the trial or later. But
the press is unwilling to give the assurance of such restraint. This is precisely where the two professions have
reached an impasse.
The Rights Involved Belong to the Public
The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees
freedom of the press-which is another way of saying
that every citizen is entitled to know things from a free
and unbridled press.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a
fair trial by an impartial jury to every citizen-which is
another way of saying that the jury must be able to try
the accused upon legal evidence alone heard in open
court.
Freedom of the press does not belong to publishers of
newspapers; it is not a property right of those who make
their living by composing, publishing and selling newspapers.
The concept of "fair trial" does not belong to the legal
profession; it is not a property right of the lawyer just
because it is something that goes on in the courtroom
where he makes a living.
Both of these rights, "fair trial" and "free press,"
belong to the people of this country, to the clients of lawyers and patrons of newspapers. It is unthinkable, therefore, that where the people have two rights such as these,
they must be required to make a choice. They are entitled
to both, and if there be a clash of these interests in any
area, there must be an accommodation between them.
In making this accommodation, the bickering that goes
on is between the high priests of the two professions, law-
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yers and publishers respectively, rather than among the
people who are the real beneficiaries of both rights. If
these two great liberties are permitted to continue to conflict, obviously, the way will soon be opened for unfair
trials on the one hand, and for unbridled license on the
other. If this ever becomes inevitably apparent, an
aroused public will take a hand and there can be no
guaranty of what will happen to either or both of the
rights.
The Jury System
The focal point of the attack upon prejudicial pre-trial
publicity is that it makes it impossible to obtain an unbiased jury. Is something wrong with the jury system?
One critic has observed that he sometimes wonders
"whether the Bar and the Bench do not try to get jurors
who are the most perfect approximation of a moron. They
seek as jurors those who never studied anything; who
don't know anything, period."' This reminds one of
the quip credited to Mark Twain, which goes: "We have
a criminal system which is superior to any in the world
and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding
every day who don't know anything and can't
twelve men
8
read. '1
Such quips are, of course, an oversimplification of the
real truth. We do want jurors who are ignorant-not
"ignorant, period," but ignorant of any of the facts surrounding the case they are about to try; ignorant of the
opinions of prosecuting attorneys, police and newspaper
editors, concerning the guilt of the accused.
As a corollary of the criticism by the press concerning
the present type of jury personnel, they suggest that we
secure blue ribbon juries, i.e. specially selected citizens
17. Bruckner, 2 CraM. LAW BULL. 23.
18. MARx TWAIN, WIT AND WISECRACFS 19.
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of higher intellect who supposedly have the capacity to
disabuse their mind of opinions formed from inflammatory pre-trial newspaper publicity."9 Hark, hark, the millennium is just around the corner!
The entire theory of the Anglo-American jury system
is that an accused is entitled to trial by a jury of his
peers, i.e., by those of the same rank and quality: a comrade, a fellow-associate. Thus our juries are drawn from
a cross-section of free men. As the Supreme Court has
aptly said of this system:
England, from whom the Western World has
largely taken its concepts of individual liberty
and of the dignity and worth of man, has bequeathed to us safeguards for their preservation, the most precious of which is that of trial
by jury. The right has become as much American
as it was once the most English.2 0
The press also suggests that changes of venue or
changes of venire be used to guarantee a fair trial if
newspaper publicity has destroyed a fair trial at home.
The answer to this is two-fold. First, the accused is entitled to trial by a jury of the vicinage, and not just by a
jury from anywhere. Second, in this day of statewide
coverage by both newspapers and radio, there is little
reason to expect that a jury from another community
within the orbit of the same press would be less prejudicial than one from the vicinage.
The GuaranteesAre Based Upon Reason
In addition to the right to trial by an impartial jury,
a person charged with a felony is entitled to counsel at
the expense of the state if he be indigent; he is presumed
19. ANPA, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRL 39 (1967).
20. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt under an elaborate system of rules of evidence designed to exclude all unfair testimony. All of these precautions are taken to insure a dispassionate trial based
upon reason.
Similarly, the guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press are to guarantee the factor of reason in public
affairs, for as Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "Those who
won our independence .. .believed in the power of reason as applied through public discussion ....I'll
Thus, the element of reason is engrained in both guarantees, but the Constitution does not tell us what to do
when the requirements of fair trial conflict with protection of a free press, yet the conflict must be resolved.
In the excellent Appendix to the ANPA Report, reference is made to an alleged concept of the framers of the
Constitution that "the rights of free speech, press and
belief, are primary natural rights fully exercised by individuals independent of organized society, while other
rights involving an individual's protection against his
society or government arise from the ' social compact.' 222
The veiled innuendo by the Committee is, therefore, that
the right of a fair trial is secondary to the right of freedom of the press. One might quickly observe in reply,
that even if it were conceded that, due to the exigencies
surrounding a newly formed republic, freedom of speech
against tyranny of government was of uppermost importance due to recent Colonial experiences with the
Crown, it does not follow that today, with our highly complex society and staggering crime rate, which necessitates -a complex judicial process, that one constitutional
guarantee is any more fundamental than another. Indeed,
the Report concedes that "no freedom is ever absolute,
21. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
22. ANPA, FREE PRESS AND FAn TRAt 26 (1967).
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and freedom of the press is no exception"" and "there
can be no fair trial without a free press and without fair
trial no freedoms can exist."2 "
If this be true, then in order for the two guarantees to
co-exist, the interests on both sides must be balanced, and
if the balancing is to be based upon reason, then to the
extent necessary to protect an individual's right to a fair
trial, there must be some limitation upon absolute freedom of the press. Either that limitation must be wrought
through an exercise of self-restraint by the press itself
or some other method must be devised.
The Fear of Censorship
The method devised by the Special Committee of the
ABA, while thought to be necessary, is unfortunate. Carried to its logical conclusion, it could readily become the
means of lowering the iron curtain behind which prejudice or corrupt police and court officials could enjoy
invulnerability. Furthermore, it leaves the news gathering media free to publish what they can dig out, and it
puts a premium on "bootleg" and other unreliable information, gossip and rumor, with the result that what is
published may not only endanger a fair trial more than
if the truth were published, but, as Dr. Frank Stanton,
President of Columbia Broadcasting System, has said,
"would plunge the judiciary system of this country, the
bar and the police, into an abyss of public suspicion and
distrust." 2 5
The argument most vociferously advanced against
denying information to the press is that such a rule, be it
a canon of ethics, rule of court, or a statute, would be the
first step to censorship in its vilest form; that any brid23. Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 2.

25. 22

NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPHER (Jan.

1967).
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ling of the press will be a denial to the people to know
what goes on in crime, law enforcement and government
circles; that publicity on such matters is an important
check on corruption and incompetency of public officials;
that the camel of censorship must not be permitted to get
his nose under the tent.
This argument is, of course, 'based upon fear rather
than upon reason, and -against it must be based the fear
that the individual may lose his right to a fair trial by
the inflammatory activities of an unbridled press.
Furthermore, what is desired by the legal profession is
not a complete suppression of all news surrounding
crime, but only such major items as alleged confessions
made by the accused, his prior criminal record, editorial
comment upon his alleged guilt, i.e., those things which
may never be produced in evidence at his trial and which,
therefore, a prospective juror should not know or consider. Second, even as to such prejudicial matters, pro-.
scribed publication is needed only for such length of time
as is necessary to ensure a fair trial, and if and when the
matters come out in evidence at the trial, they may then
be published. Of course, after the trial anything may
be published whether it came out at the trial or not.
One answer of the press to this is: "The characteristic
that most distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism
is that the means are as important as the end. It is not
enough for the public merely to know the end result of a
trial, they need to know the means to that end." 2 6
But here again, even if the major premise be conceded,
which many will not, the argument as it applies to the
problem at hand overlooks the element of timing. There
is no objection to full disclosure of the means used as
they unfold at the trial and thereafter.
But be it fear or any other emotion of the press, it is
26. ANPA, FREE PRESS AND FAin TRTAL 2 (1967).
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unfortunate that the legal profession feels driven to the
device of censorship of what may be revealed to the press
by the profession and law enforcement officers. Reason
would seem to dictate a better mutual solution to the
problem.
Just because there is fear that the whole of the camel
may get in if we let his nose get under the tent, is no
reason why we must imitate the ostrich by burying our
heads in the sand.
The fallacy of much of the position taken by the press
is that they do not want merely to report news, they want
to make it. They do not want to wait until a witness under
oath, and subject to cross-examination, has made news by
actually giving his testimony-they want to publish ahead
of time, either the hearsay of the police or lawyer as to
what the witness expects to testify, or the unsworn statement of the witness himself. As pointed out before, much
of this will not be legal evidence, will not be admissible
into evidence, will never get before the jury; indeed,
the witness may not even be available at the trial due to
absence from the jurisdiction or death.
In this connection, one of the conclusions of the ANPA
Committee Report is: "The press has a responsibility to
allay public fears and dispel rumors by the disclosure of
fact." 2 7 In legal matters, a statement is not a fact until
a judge has ruled it to be admissible into evidence. The
physical phenomena that an accused has made a statement purporting to be a confession, does not make that
statement a confession until a judge has ruled that it is
one as a matter of legal fact. The fact that the police or
prosecuting attorney utters an opinion as to the guilt of
an accused, will never become a legal fact. Therefore, if
the news media has a responsibility in the area of reporting legal matters, i.e., to disclose legal facts, then they
27. Id. at 1.
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should wait until physical phenomena becomes legal fact
before reporting it.
In apparent recognition of the delicacy of the problem
involved, many individual newspapers and regional news
media have adopted guide lines of self-restraint restricting the pre-trial publication of certain information considered potentially prejudicial by the legal profession.
An example is the set of guidelines recommended by the
American Society of Newspaper Editors:
Full disclosure of the facts of a crime before,
and at the time of arrest to inform, allay the
alarm of, or assure the public of the extent and
quality of law enforcement;
Exercise of great care by all parties in the sensitive area of pre-trial, particularly in the use of
extra-judicial statements (off-hand assertions by
police or prosecutors, as to the guilt of an accused, and publication of 'confessions' before
they are ruled admissible as evidence);
Release of all pertinent facts in the immediate
post-trial state (i.e., before any appeal has been
concluded)."2
The apathy of the ANPA Committee to these moves
made by individual segments of the news media is iMlustrated by its comments preceding that portion of its Report. "This particular section of our report merely attempts to present factually ideas of this nature which
are representative of actions taken to date ....
It is also
interesting to note that there has been no wide-spread
acceptance by any substantial number of news media of
the restrictions which we are discussing." 2 9
28. 2 TRIAL 5 (Oct-Nov. 1966).

29. ANPA, FREE PRESS

AND FAIR

TnA 95, 96 (1967).
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ForebodingClouds Overhang the Press
The concepts of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press have enjoyed peculiar protection in the past from
the interpretations placed upon the First Amendment by
the Supreme Court of the United States. In the broad
general area under discussion here, this protection has
resulted from application of the so-called "Clear and
Present Danger Test," which only outlaws utterances in
which "the substantial evil" flowing from any such utterance "would be extremely serious" and the "degree
of imminence extremely high." But the cases enunciating the doctrine have been contempt citations against
newspapers and individuals critical of the government or
government officials, judges and the like." The balances
weigh heavily, in such cases, in favor of the press. But
when a powerful corporate press is on one side and the
"substantial evil" to be avoided on the other side is the
right of a citizen to a fair trial, there is no assurance that
the test would be the same, or if it is, that the application
would be the same. Indeed, the Court has called attention
to the fact that the contempt cases referred to did not
''represent a situation where an individual is on trial"
where "prejudice might result to one litigant or the
other," and "of course the limitations on free speech assume a different proportion when expression is directed
toward a trial as compared to a grand jury investigation."" Observe also the comment of two dissenting justices in the same case: "The right of free speech, strong
though it may be, is not absolute. When the right to speak
conflicts with the right to an impartial judicial proceeding, an accomodation must be made to preserve the essence of each."
30. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946); Craigv. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
31. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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In this day of tumbling constitutional cornerstones, the
press may no longer smugly rest upon laurels won by it
in the past in the legal arena-it may rest no more than
many other segments of our society, which, in recent
years, have seen one traditional constitutional concept
after another of long standing, swept aside by the increasingly aggressive legislative prerogatives arrogated
to itself by the Supreme Court of the United States. That
Court is fully capable of sufficient ingenuity to find an
answer to Jefferson's dilemna which occasioned his statement: "I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our
newspapers have passed. . . It is however an evil for
which there is no remedy, for our liberty depends on the
freedom of the press and that cannot be limited without
being lost." 3 2
Indeed, the handwriting on the wall may be indicated
by such recent statements as the following in Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Irvin v. Dowd:
This Court has not decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must be subordinated
to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly conceived.
The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is
constitutionally protected in plying his trade."
Consider also the implications contained in the following
statement of the Court:
While maximum freedom must be allowed the
press in carrying on this important function [exposing corruption and reporting public events]
PANDOvER, DIEMOCRACY 150-151.
33. Supra note 20, at 730.

32.
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in a democratic society its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute
fairness in the judicial process."
More pointedly are the remarks of the Court in Sheppard:
And where there was "no threat or menace to the
intergrity of the trial," Craigv. Harney,we have
consistently required that the press have a free
hand, even though we sometimes deplored its
sensationalism. But the Court has also pointed
out that "legal trials are not like those of eleetions, to be won through the use of the meetinghall, the radio, and the newspaper," Bridges v.
California....
"Freedom of discussion should
be given the widest range compatible with the
essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice," Pennekamp v. Florida.
But it must not be allowed to divert the trial
from the "very purpose of a court system ...
to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and
civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures," Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583, 85 S. Ct. 466, 13
L. Ed. 2d 487 (1965).35
In refering to those things which the trial judge might
have done to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial, the Court
said:
More specifically, the trial Court might have
proscribed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness or court official, which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal
of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take
any lie detector tests; the identity of prospective
34. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
35. Supra note 5.
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witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief
in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case .... the court could
have also requested the appropriate city and
county officials to promulgate a regulation with
respect to dissemination36of information about the
case by their employees.
These statements by the Court refer obviously to pretrial matters, and they are the statements upon which the
recommendations of the ABA Committee are based; and
they forebode a rude awakening by the press with respect to its cavalier, if not defiant, position taken in the
current problem.
Few lawyers, however, desire to see the issue resolved
by statutory enactment, although there are those who
recommend this procedure. A small minority would support regulation by rule of court, with the contempt process enlarged to make amenable thereto a newspaper
which violated any such rule of court. As has been observed earlier herein, the organized bar seems headed
for self-restraint imposed upon its members through a
tight canon of legal ethics which will dry up the information at the source.
F. Lee Bailey, counsel for Dr. Sheppard in his successful bid to have the Supreme Court reverse his conviction, envisions still another remedy, viz., a civil suit
for damages against a newspaper by an accused whose
right to a fair trial has been destroyed by deliberate newspaper publicity. 7 Now that Dr. Sheppard has been acquitted on his second trial, we may see just such an action
brought. The press is suitably restrained from frivilous
defamation by the prospects of damages recoverable in
libel actions. Exercise of freedom in this area is costly.
36. Ibid.
37. 2 TMIAL 55 (Apr.-May 1966).
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Should it be less so for deprival of the right to a fair
trial? Time will tell.
In this same vein, one of the recommendations of the
ABA Committee is, that, whenever a person is held in
contempt of court in this area of the law, the court shall
have authority to allocate any fine imposed to pay the accused for any extra costs he has been put to in securing a
change of venue or a new trial.
Conclusion
The press claims that they cannot impose upon the
news media a code of restrictions upon reporting; that
it is unlike the legal profession which is a licensed profession, and in which, therefore, it is proper to have a
canon of legal ethics for the violation of which a member
may be disbarred. That news reporting is by its very
nature an unlicensed profession; that if it is to be free,
then by necessity it cannot have a canon of ethics in the
professional sense which would prohibit or license what
shall be reported; that to discipline a news reporter
would be to undermine the very freedom involved in the
concept of freedom of the press. So runs the contention.
The fact is, however, that the press does exercise selfrestraint in many areas of reporting. Except for certain
"'rags" found on some of the urban news-stands in our
larger cities, the overwhelming number of respectable
papers which find their way into the American home, do
exercise self-restraint in matters of taste. And, as has
been noted earlier, there being no license to slander, the
prospects of a damage suit is sufficient restraint against
publication in this area.
Reason would dictate that the current problem be resolved by making all information available to the pressand that in return, the press, by voluntary self-restraint,
hold up on the publication of those matters considered po-
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tentially prejudicial -by the legal profession until such
matters have been produced at the trial, -and if not produced at the trial, then until the trial has concluded.
It is quite immaterial whether the press exercise this
self-restraint by a code of ethics, policy, guidelines, or
gentleman's agreement or any other method. Any such
restraint for a short time period, i.e. until the trial, upon
publication of a few crucial matters which potentially endanger a fair trial, is not a bargaining away of the right
of the public to know. The public's right to know these
things in a given case, does not mean the right to know
now. It is only due to the desire of the newspaper to sensationalize the matter, and sensationalize it now, that the
problem of pre-trial publicity arises at all.
By a procedure of delayed publication, the press would
fully discharge its duty to the public. It could continue its
proper watchdog activities of possible corruption in high
places; it would be possessed of all the pre-trial information; it could use the unprejudicial portion of this information at any time; and it could make use of the balance
at a time when it would not jeopardize a fair trial to the
accused.
It is to be hoped, therefore, that the two professions
will work out their differences before either Association
adopts in toto the reports of their respective special
committees.

